Job search requirements for older unemployment: Transitions to employment, early retirement and disability benefits by Bloemen, H.G. et al.
TI 2011-008/3 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
 
 
Job Search Requirements for Older 
Unemployed: Transitions to 
Employment, Early Retirement and 
Disability Benefits 
  
Hans Bloemen 
Stefan Hochguertel 
Marloes Lammers 
 
VU University Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute, and Netspar 
 
 
Tinbergen Institute is the graduate school and research institute in economics of Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, the University of Amsterdam and VU University Amsterdam. 
 
More TI discussion papers can be downloaded at http://www.tinbergen.nl 
 
Tinbergen  Institute has two locations: 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Gustav Mahlerplein 117 
1082 MS Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 525 1600 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
Duisenberg school of finance is a collaboration of the Dutch financial sector and universities, 
with the ambition to support innovative research and offer top quality academic education in 
core areas of finance. 
More DSF research papers can be downloaded at: http://www.dsf.nl/ 
 
Duisenberg school of finance 
Gustav Mahlerplein 117 
1082 MS Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 525 8579 
 
 
Job search requirements for older unemployed: transitions to
employment, early retirement and disability benets
Hans Bloemen, Stefan Hochguertel, Marloes Lammersy
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute, and Netspar
This version: January 2011
Abstract
In this paper, we use a recent policy change in the Netherlands to study how changes in search
requirements for the older unemployed a¤ect their transition rates to employment, early retirement and
sickness/disability benets. The reform, becoming e¤ective on January 1st 2004, required the elderly
to formally report their job search e¤orts to the employment o¢ ce in order to avoid a (temporary)
cut in benets. Before the new law was passed, unemployed were allowed to stop all search activity
at the moment they turned 57.5. Estimating various duration models using di¤erence-in-di¤erence and
regression discontinuity approaches, we nd that for several groups of individuals that were a¤ected by the
policy change, the stricter search requirements did signicantly increase their entry rate into employment.
However, we also nd evidence of a higher outow to sickness/disability insurance schemes, a presumably
unwanted side-e¤ect of the policy change.
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1 Introduction
How can policy be successful in keeping older workers attached to the labor market? This question is central
to policy reforms involving an outward shift of retirement age to 67 and beyond, as is being discussed or
implemented in many countries. One important aspect of increasing the labor market participation of older
individuals is to get them back to work after a period of unemployment. However, little is known about
the labor market behavior of this growing age class. In particular job search behavior and its relation to
nancial incentives are not well documented. This state of a¤airs is peculiar since inow rates of older
workers into unemployment are typically higher than those of prime-aged employees. Outow rates back
into employment are, on the other hand, remarkably low. It is well documented that a job loss results in
large and lasting e¤ects on future employment probabilities of older workers, for example in the U.S (Chan
and Stevens (2001)) and in the Netherlands (de Graaf-Zijl and Hop (2007)).
This paper exploits a recent policy change in the Netherlands to examine how changes in search re-
quirements for the older unemployed a¤ect their transition rates to employment, retirement and disability
benets. Before January 1st 2004, older unemployed (dened as being at least 57.5 years old) were not
required to actively search for a job in order to receive full UI benets. After that date, the 57.5+ year-olds
faced the same regulations as other age groups and needed to report their (formal) search behaviour to the
unemployment o¢ ce.
To study labor market transitions of older workers, access to a dataset with a large cross sectional
dimension is needed. Labor market surveys are usually based on a representative sample of the entire
working age population and only a tiny fraction of older unemployed individuals is observed, precluding
meaningful analyses of transition behavior for this group. The present paper contributes to lling this gap
by using a large administrative database covering all registered benet and wage receipts in the Netherlands,
including all individuals on UI benets. The data provides very precise information on income and labor
market status, giving us a large enough sample to analyze labor market transitions of the older unemployed
in the years 2001 to 2005.
This study is related to the large strand of literature examining the e¤ects of changes in the UI benet
system on unemployment duration. Most of these papers are concerned with e¤ects of sanctions or training
programs (Abbring et al. (2005), van den Berg et al. (2004), van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006)),
changes in potential benet duration (Caliendo et al. (2009), Card and Levine (2000), Kyyrä and Ollikainen
(2008), Lalive et al. (2006), Lalive (2008), van Ours and Vodopivec (2006)) or the level or replacement
rate of unemployment benets (Carling et. al. (2001), Røed and Zhang (2003)). Studies examining a
tightening of search requirements are less widespread. Manning (2009) nds large ows out of claimant
status upon a tightening of search requirements in the U.K but does not nd an e¤ect on search intensity.
Petrongolo (2009), studying the same U.K. reform, concludes that although unemployment duration has
decreased, the outow to disability insurance benets increased, indicating that some individuals decided to
stop searching and to enter other social insurance schemes instead. Our paper is closest to Heyma and van
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Ours (2005), who examine the e¤ect of a discontinuity in UI eligibility criteria for the Dutch elderly. They
nd a substantially lower outow to jobs for individuals that turn 57.5 and are no longer required to actively
search for a job. In contrast to Heyma and van Ours (2005), our dataset follows individuals both before
and after the policy change. Making use not only of variation in age, but also variation over time, we are
able to estimate treatment e¤ects for various groups of treated individuals. Moreover, instead of focussing
only on unemployment to employment transitions, we also shed light on substitution between various social
insurance programs by considering both DI receipt and early retirement as competing risks for the exit out
of unemployment. Indeed, one of the desired consequences of imposing stricter requirements for receiving
UI benets is to save on government spending by decreasing the number of individuals eligible for receipt
of these benets. This can be done directly by excluding individuals from receiving UI benets in case they
do not comply with the new rules, or by making the receipt of UI benets so unattractive that individuals
start to look for alternatives themselves. However, the alternative that the government has in mind (paid
employment) might not be the most attractive alternative from the point of view of the individual. The
unemployed worker might instead substitute towards other benet types, such as disability benets or, in case
of the elderly, early retirement benets (provided that eligibility conditions for such schemes can be met).
Since costly substitution between programs that insure di¤erent risks should be avoided, spill-over e¤ects
among these government programs are an important part of policy evaluation. In this paper, we are able to
furnish empirical evidence as to the importance of the various channels. Estimating exible form competing
risks duration models using di¤erence-in-di¤erence and regression discontinuity approaches, we nd that for
several groups of individuals that were a¤ected by the policy change, the stricter search requirements did
signicantly increase the entry rate into employment by about 6 percentage points. However, we also nd
evidence of a higher outow to disability insurance by 2.5 to 4 percentage points, a presumably unwanted
side-e¤ect of the policy change. In contrast, no signicant substitution from UI benets towards early
retirement benets could be found.
The remainder of the paper is set up as follows. Section 2 presents some important aspects of the
Dutch UI system, with a focus on changes in the system aimed at the older unemployed. It also gives a brief
description of the sickness/disability insurance (DI) benet and early retirement systems and changes therein.
Theoretical e¤ects of an increase in search requirements are considered in section 3. The empirical analysis
starts out in Section 4 with a description of the data and the selection of treatment and control groups
for analysis. Section 5 presents the estimation strategy and some descriptive evidence, before continuing to
estimation results given in Sections 6 and 7. Finally, Section 8 studies post-unemployment job characteristics.
Section 9 concludes.
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2 Institutional Context
This section gives an overview of the UI benet system in the Netherlands and reports important policy
changes aimed at the elderly. It also considers changes in the DI and early retirement system that could
possibly a¤ect the inow in these social insurance schemes for older unemployed workers. Our focus is on
the years 2001-2005, as the data available to us are informative on this time period.
2.1 The Dutch Unemployment Insurance System and Developments from 2001-
2005
2.1.1 The Dutch Unemployment Insurance System
In the Netherlands, three types of UI benets can be received: short-term UI-benets, wage-related UI-
benets and follow-up-benets. In order to be eligible for short-term UI-benets, an individual needs to have
worked at least 26 weeks out of the 39 weeks before becoming unemployed (the 26-out-of-39 requirement)
and be available for work(for example, an individual cannot live abroad or join an educational program).
Short-term benets can be received for at most 6 months and are set to 70% of the prevailing minimum
wage or 70% of average last-earned wage, whichever one is less. Wage-related benets are paid out when the
claimant fullls the 26-out-of-39 requirement and in addition worked for 52 days or more in at least 4 out
of the 5 (calendar) years before he became unemployed.1 The benets are set to 70% of the average wage
earned at the last employer, with a maximum of about e29,000 a year in 2003. Follow-up benets are to
be received after the maximum duration of wage-related benets have expired, and have the same height as
short-term benets. An overview of the system is given in Table 1.
The maximum duration of wage-related benets is a step-wise function of age. A potential employment
history is calculated by adding the number of years from the year an individual turned 18 until ve cal-
endar years before unemployment starts to the 4 (or 5) years that an individual worked before becoming
unemployed. A longer potential employment history implies a longer UI eligibility, with a maximum of 5
years for wage-related benets. For most individuals, maximum duration for follow-up benets is two years.
However, if a worker loses his job at age 57.5 or above, follow-up benets can be received for up to 3.5 years.
A graphical representation of potential benet durations for wage-related and follow-up UI benets and their
relation to age at unemployment is given in Figure 1.
2.1.2 Developments in the Dutch Unemployment Insurance System 2001-2005
In the period under study, a number of reforms in the UI system took place. Here we present an overview
of reforms specically aimed at (increasing the participation rate of) older unemployed.
1Years in which an individual takes care of a child who is less than 6 years old are also considered as a working year. For a
child between 6 and 12 years of age, half a year per year of care is added to the number of working years.
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First, employers were obliged to pay part of the UI benets if they re an employee aged 57.5 or above
from May 11th 2001 onwards.2 Second, for individuals becoming unemployed on or after August 11th 2003,
follow-up-benets were abolished. Instead, those aged 50+ when becoming unemployed fell under the so-
called IOAW scheme with payments that provide the household with an income of 70% of minimum wage
after expiry of UI benets. This is the same level of benets previously provided for by follow-up UI benets.
The di¤erence with receiving extended benets is that in IOAW applying for jobs is compulsory and that
benets are tested against the income of the spouse. A third reform became e¤ective on January 1st 2004
and changed the conditions for UI benet receipt: older unemployed (57.5+) were no longer exempted from
the requirement to actively search for jobs. Finally, starting from the 1st of January 2005, potential duration
of wage-related benets for new UI recipients were made (partly) dependent on actual employment history
instead of merely on age. An employment history is calculated from the number of years actually worked
between 1998 and the calendar year preceding unemployment and the number of years potentially worked
before 1998 (1998-18- year of birth). An overview of the developments aimed at older unemployed can be
found in Table 2.
Focus of the present paper is the January 1st 2004 reform when older (57.5+) job seekers lost their
special status in terms of search requirements. Post-reform, they were treated in the same way as all
other unemployed, including an intake meeting and a meeting in which they are informed about the search
obligation.3 Search requirements stipulate to apply to at least 4 jobs in 4 weeks. Noncompliers run the
risk of being severely sanctioned: benets can be reduced with a maximum of 20 percentage points for 16
consecutive weeks. In case of recidivism, this can be as high as 30 percentage points. Table 3 shows that
in the year 2004, in which the policy change became e¤ective, there was an increase of about 5 percentage
points in the share of sanctions due to noncompliance with the search requirement as a percentage of the
total number of sanctions. Since there was also about a 5 percentage point increase in the number of UI
benet recipients needing to report their search e¤ort, these descriptives suggest that there were indeed also
sanctions levied on older individuals.4 Table 4 shows that huge cuts in benets indeed take place in practice:
noncompliers are punished with an average 20 percentage points cut in benets (from 70 to 50 percent of
previous/minimum wage) for 14 consecutive weeks.5 Appendix A.1.1 gives a more detailed description of
the Dutch Unemployment Insurance procedure.
2The contribution in benet payments depends on the size of the rm, with a maximum of 30% of gross UI payments for
companies with more than 50 employees. An extra restriction is that a maximum of 3% of total wages in the company may be
paid as UI benets to older ex-workers.
3On May 1st 1999, the obligation to attend an intake meeting and the requirement to accept suitable jobs (if o¤ered by
the unemployment o¢ ce) was extended to include the elderly who turned 57.5 on May 1st 1999 or later.
4Anecdotal evidence (Verveen et al., 2005) suggests that the elderly were more likely to comply with the newly imposed
search requirements. Indeed, Table 3 only gives descriptive evidence of the actual imposition of sanctions on the elderly. In our
data, we unfortunately do not observe when and whether sanctions have been imposed, nor do we observe the actual search
e¤ort of individuals.
5The shorter average duration is caused by the fact that there are some individuals who started working before the end of
the sanction spell.
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Not only newly unemployed were a¤ected by this change in search requirements. For elderly that were
already unemployed, a transitional arrangement was in place: the search requirement was activated on
January 1st 2004 for all individuals that have been unemployed for less than one year at December 31st 2003
and did not yet reach the age of 62 years and 2 months at the 1st of January 2004. Moreover, all individuals
that did not reach the age of 57.5 before the 31st of December 2003 also needed to continue searching when
turning 57.5, even if they have been unemployed for more than a year. Exceptions to the obligation to search
were made, among others, for individuals aged 64 or above on their rst day of unemployment, for individuals
starting up their own business or taking part in an educational program which is considered necessary for
re-integration, and for individuals aged 57.5 or above at the 31st of December 2003 who received DI benets
just before entering UI.
2.2 The Dutch Disability Insurance System
It is well known that not all individuals entering DI are actually disabled. Autor and Duggan (2003) nd
that DI is used as a substitute for UI in the U.S.. For the Netherlands, Koning and van Vuuren (2007)
nd that 3% of all dismissals takes place via the DI scheme. These ndings suggest that individuals can to
some extent choose to enter DI, and therefore a change in DI inow may be triggered by adjustments in the
UI system. However, instead of being pushedfrom UI into DI (as is the case when search requirements
for eligibility of UI increase) individuals can be pulled into DI upon modication of the latter system.
We therefore present an overview of the Dutch DI system. Nearly all policy changes from 2001-2005 were
aimed at employers and are irrelevant to the unemployed. An overview of major adjustments is deferred to
Appendix A.1.2.
The Dutch DI System in 2001 consists of two main Acts: the Sickness Act (SA) and the Disability Act
(DA). The SA provides an income oor to anyone with or without employer, including those receiving UI
benets, in case of sickness or disability. In most cases, UI benet recipients who become ill or otherwise
disabled receive 70% of their former wage for up to 1 year. After receiving sickness benets for a full year, an
individual enters the Disability Act. After medical examination, a worker who is considered at least partially
disabled (>15%) is eligible for DA payments of up to 70% of last earned wage, depending on the degree of
disability. Individuals aged 58 and older receive wage-related DA benets for a maximum of 6 years, and
individuals in the age range 53-57 for 3 years. From the age of 59 onwards, wage-related DA benets can
therefore be received until age 65, after which an individual becomes eligible for old age pension payments.
After wage-related DA benets have expired, individuals receive a follow-up benet. The follow-up benet
is also dependent on age and previous wage and can be received for as long as the disability lasts.
2.3 The Dutch Early Retirement System
In the Netherlands the old age pension system consists of three tiers: the rst tier encompasses social
assistance in the form of a basic pension, nanced by premiums levied on the working age population (a
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PAYG system), the second tier consists of supplementary schemes provided by employers and employees in
industry-specic collective agreements (CAOs) and the third and last tier comprises private, individually
nanced pensions and savings.
The single largest change in the early retirement system in the late 1990s and early 2000s was the
transformation of the second tier. Early retirement pension payments that used to be actuarially unfair
and nanced by a PAYG system were slowly replaced by actuarially fair capital funded schemes. Instead
of applying a at rate, which eliminated the nancial incentive to continue working, pension payments in
the new system decreased upon retirement at an earlier age. Moreover, the replacement rate was greatly
reduced (from 80% to 70% when retiring at the age of 62 in some of the larger sectors). As from the 1st of
April 1997, the pension system for civil servants (ABP) was the rst to transfer to the new Pre-Pension
(PP) scheme. Euwals et al. (2010), examining this change in the early retirement system, nd that the shift
to an actuarially fair system with lower pension wealth induced individuals to retire later.
Individuals that are at least 40 years old at the time they become unemployed, continue to build up
their second tier pension rights as long as they receive wage-related UI benets. Moreover, for individuals
who are at least 57.5 years of age when they become unemployed, this freebuilding up of pension rights
continues until they reach the legal retirement age of 65. However, since with the introduction of the new
PP scheme a switch to a capital-funded system was enacted, early retirees were no longer building up their
pension rights, making it even more attractive for UI benet recipients to stay unemployed.
3 Theoretical considerations
In a standard two-state job search model, an increase in search requirements a¤ects job search both directly
and indirectly. The direct e¤ect is to increase search e¤ort for individuals that would otherwise search less
than the newly dened threshold. However, introducing a required minimum of formal search also implies
an increase in the cost of search for each job application. This (i) decreases search e¤ort for individuals
already conforming to the new search requirements by means of informal search, (ii) decreases the value of
unemployment (which decreases the reservation wage) and thereby increases search e¤ort, (iii) by decreasing
the value of unemployment also decreases the value of the subsequent job and thereby decreases search e¤ort
(the so-called entitlement e¤ect, Mortensen (1977)). Following van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006),
who argue that in case of older workers the use of informal channels is limited, we can expect the rst indirect
e¤ect to be modest. Moreover, for elderly the entitlement e¤ecte¤ect is also small: a possible new spell of
UI benets can only comprise a limited number of years, since from the age of 65 they will receive pension
payments instead. Search requirements may therefore be especially e¤ective for the elderly.
On the worker demand side, the job o¤er probability for the older unemployed might change as a result of
enforcing minimum job search requirements: formal search requirements could lead to fake applications by the
elderly, thereby stigmatizing job applications of older workers such that employers will be less willing to hire
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them. More in general, an increase in the required amount of search e¤ort could lead to a changing average
productivity of applicants: assuming that initially only the most motivated individuals with good labor
market prospects were engaged in active job search, average productivity of the applicant pool decreases,
again leading to a lower job o¤er probability for older unemployed. In conclusion, it is not immediate that
introducing formal job search as a conditioni for UI benet receipt will increase the job nding rate of elderly.
Now consider a three-state search model in which the option to collect a type of benet other than UI
is introduced. Since formal search requirements reduce the value of receiving UI benets, whereas the value
of receiving other benets stays constant, individuals can decide to forgo UI benets and collect those other
benets instead (that is, if eligibility conditions can be met with positive probability). In case of older
unemployed, two important other social insurance schemes are DI and early retirement pensions. Naturally,
the subsitution to another type of benet is more likely the higher the initial value of receiving these benets.
Considering the choice between substitution towards DI benets or early retirement pension payments, the
balance is more likely to tip in favor of DI benets since the expected value of applying for DI benets is
high. First, the possible duration of DI benets is 6 years for individuals aged 58 and older, which is longer
than the maximum of 5 years of wage-related UI benets. Furthermore, the total potential benet duration
(PBD) of UI benet receipt is not decreased by an intervening spell of sickness/disability, already providing
individuals with a rationale to substitute to DI (if only temporarily). A change in search requirements in UI
could therefore just make the required di¤erence for DI to be a worthwhile alternative.6 In contrast, early
retirement pension payments have become less attractive over time. Since in the old pension system (VUT)
retirement benets were at a at rate of around 80% from age 59 onwards (or 60, 61 depending on the sector
of previous employment), there used to be a high incentive to switch to receipt of early retirement pensions
at that pivotal age. Since with the new capital-funded PP scheme individualsold age pension replacement
rates continued to increase with retirement age until an age of 65, the incentive to switch to early retirement
was greatly reduced.
4 Data and Selection of Treatment/Control Groups
We make use of administrative data obtained from Statistics Netherlands. The so-called SSB (Social Sta-
tistical Files) data is obtained from municipalities, tax authorities and social insurance administrations. It
contains detailed information on income variables and beginning- and enddate of benet and wage payments
for all individuals living in the Netherlands. Using this information, we can determine the labor force state
of an individual for the years 1999-2005 with daily precision. The states that we can distinguish include full-
time and part-time employment, being unemployed (receiving unemployment insurance), being ill/disabled
(receiving sickness or disability benets) and entering (early) retirement (receiving pension payments).
6Note also that following an increase in compulsory search, the higher burden put on the elderly could cause an actual
deterioration in health for some, thereby increasing the probability of receiving DI benets directly and making substitution
more likely.
8
The information in the SSB is merged with information on education available from the unemployment
o¢ ce. Since the data on education is only available from 2001-2006, information on education is missing
for the short-term unemployed that became unemployed in the years 1999 or 2000 and only have one spell
of employment over the years 2001-2006. Since this group is likely to be selective we exclude individuals
becoming unemployed before the year 2001.
In order to examine the policy change, we select groups of older individuals (55.5-59.5 at the time of
inow) becoming unemployed in 2001, 2003 and 2004. Individuals becoming unemployed before 2003 are
una¤ected by the policy change as long as they are older than 57.5 on the 1st of January 2004. Since only
individuals with an age at inow of 55.5 years or older are selected for analysis, our selected unemployment
spells starting in 2001 are una¤ected by the change in policy. They are therefore subject to the initial
regulations: those that become unemployed and are younger than 57.5 at the time of inow are required to
search for a job. However, if they are still unemployed when they turn 57.5, they can quit searching without
consequences for their UI eligibility. Individuals that are 57.5 years or older at the time of inow never need
to report any search activities. Our 2001 inow can therefore serve as a control group.
Individuals entering the UI benet system in the year 2004 are a¤ected by the policy change, in var-
ious ways. Unemployed aged 57.5+ and entering unemployment in 2004 need to actively search for new
employment, allowing us to study the e¤ect of being required to search from the start of the unemployment
spell versus never having a formal requirement to search. Those younger than 57.5 at time of inow need
to continue searching at the age of 57.5. Here we can examine the e¤ect of needing to continue searching at
age 57.5 versus being allowed to stop searching at that age.
The 2003 inow is a¤ected in a way that is di¤erent from the individuals that enter unemployment in
2004. The group of individuals aged 57.5 and over at the time they start their unemployment spell at
rst instance did not need to search for a job. However, when they were still unemployed at the 1st of
January, they were required to start searching. In order to only estimate the e¤ect of an increase in search
requirements, we drop individuals that became unemployed from the 11th of August onwards. Our 2003
inow sample therefore is not a¤ected by a cancellation of extended benets (see Section 2.1.2). Using the
2003 treatment group, we can investigate the e¤ect of needing to search formally after being unemployed for
5-12 months, versus not being required to search at all.
To sum up, we select a control group (inow in 2001), a partlytreated group (inow in 2003) and a
fully treated group (inow in 2004) for analysis. We drop less than 1% of these individuals because of
unobserved covariates (mainly education). Moreover, since search requirements were abolished in 2004 for
individuals that were in DI before owing into the UI system, we select only individuals that came from
private sector jobs to ensure that all individuals in our treatment groups were indeed a¤ected by the reform.7
Table 5 shows us the distribution of states of origin for the various years of inow. Inow from DI benets
7Another reason to exclude these individuals is that their latent probabilities to nd a job or to enter another DI spell are
very di¤erent from those of previously employed individuals.
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is slightly larger in 2001, following the declining trend in the number of DI recipients as a percentage of
the labor force in the Netherlands (de Jong, 2008). We therefore nd no evidence that our inow sample
confronts us with selectivity issues. The nal sample comprises 30053 observations for analysis.
5 Methodology and Descriptive Statistics
5.1 Regression Specications
We specify hazard models for the exit rate to a job, disability benets and early retirement payments and
adopt regression discontinuity and di¤erence-in-di¤erence approaches as our main identication strategies.
Let  I be the day of inow, aI the age at inow and T total unemployment duration. Moreover, let a
denote a time-varying variable indicating the age of an individual at calendar time  . The transition rates
from unemployment to some exit state x are a¤ected by a vector of observable characteristics X at the time
an individual starts his or her unemployment spell. We assume that exit to any state can be described by a
proportional hazard model following a piecewise constant exponential function.
In a rst regression specication, we select individuals becoming unemployed in 2001 (non-treated) and
in 2004 (treated). Then the instantaneous probability of leaving unemployment to exit state x, given that
the individual is still unemployed at unemployment duration t is given by the hazard rate x(tjX;  I ; aI ; a ):
x= (t) exp fX 0 + 1I04+2I[aI 57:5] + 3(I04I[aI 57:5]) + 4I[a 57:5] + 5(I04I[a 57:5])g
(1)
where I04 is a dummy indicating whether the year of inow was 2004 ( I = 2004), I[aI  57:5] is an
indicator function equal to 1 when an individual is at least 57.5 years of age at inow into unemployment,
and the interaction e¤ect I04  I[aI  57:5] picks up a rst treatment e¤ect: the need to fulll formal search
requirements from the start of unemployment when an individual is at least 57.5 years old at inow, i.e.
an always searche¤ect. The indicator I[a  57:5] is a time-varying variable equal to 1 from the time an
individual turns 57.5 and the interaction I04  I[a  57:5] picks up a second treatment e¤ect: the need to
formally continue search when a person turns 57.5 as opposed to being allowed to stop searching at that
moment, i.e. a continue searche¤ect.
Note that the inclusion of the parameters 4 and 5 do not only allow us to examine a second treatment
e¤ect, but is also needed to correctly estimate the rst treatment e¤ect: since we are using individuals aged
55.5-57.5 as our control group to identify the always searche¤ect 3 (the e¤ect on the 57.5-59.5 year olds)
we do need to correct for the fact that the younger individuals that became unemployed in 2004 also got
treated as from the age of 57.5 onwards.
A second regression takes only individuals aged 57.5-59.5, becoming unemployed either in 2003 (treatment
group) or in 2001 (control group) to estimate the e¤ect of the policy change for those that did not formally
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search for a job until being unemployed for 5-12 months:
x= (t) exp fX 0 + 1I03+2I[  1 Jan 2004] + 3(I03I[  1 Jan 2004])g (2)
where I03 indicates possibility of treatment if still unemployed at January 1st 2004 (i.e. inow in 2003),
I[  1 Jan 2004] is an indicator function equal to 1 from the moment an individual reaches the 1st of
January 2004, and the interaction e¤ect I03  I[  1 Jan 2004] picks up a third treatment e¤ect: the
need to start fullling formal search requirements after 5-12 months in unemployment, for individuals aged
57.5-59.5 at the start of their unemployment spell, i.e. a start searche¤ect.
The baseline hazard (t) for both empirical models species duration dependence in the form of a exible
piecewise constant function:
(t) = exp
 
KX
k=1
kIk(t)
!
with Ik(t) is an indicator function taking the value 1 if duration t is in interval k. We specify K = 7
duration intervals, dened as durations from 0-1 month, 1-2 months, 2-3 months, 3-6 months, 6-12 months,
12-24 months and 24+ months. We normalize 1 = 0.
For both regressions, the density of total unemployment duration T for a spell with exit state x can
therefore be written as:
fxi (T jX) = xi (T jX) exp
 
 
Z T
0
xi (sjX)ds
!
The loglikelihood adds the contributions of uncensored and censored spells:
Lx =
X
i2fncg
log xi (T jX) +
X
i
 
Z T
0
xi (sjX)ds (3)
where fncg denotes the set of noncensored spells: all individuals that are observed to exit to state x. A
spell is considered censored when still ongoing at the 31th December 2004 or when an individual is observed
to exit to a state other than x. Tables 7 and 8 in Appendix A.3 give a schematic overview of the identication
of the parameters for both regression specications.
In order to control for observed heterogeneity between the treatment and control groups, we include
as background characteristics dummies for marital status, age and its square, nationality (Dutch, foreign-
born with a western nationality, or foreign-born with a non-western nationality), and a dummy indicating
whether there are any dependent children in the household. We furthermore control for education level
in four categories: whether the highest diploma an individual received was primary school, a low level of
highschool/the lowest level of higher education, a high level of highschool/a middle level of higher education
or higher professional education/university. We also include a regressor on whether the individual is on a
spell with a revivedUI right. A right is considered revived when an unemployment spell is interrupted by
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a job or sickness/disability spell and an individual gets back in unemployment (before having the chance
to build up new UI rights). In this case, UI benets can be received for the remainder of the potential
benet duration and therefore the total potential benet duration for the individual is shortened. Two
other indicators for potential benet duration give information on whether an individual is on a spell with a
long potential benet duration (i.e. receives wage-related or extended benets) or on short-term UI-benets
(a potential benet duration of 6 months). Moreover, we include the quarters of the year as time-varying
variables, thereby allowing for seasonal e¤ects on outow. In regression (1) instead of imposing a quadratic
age-e¤ect, we include a number of time-varying age-regressors (turning 56, turning 57, turning 58 etc.) and
interactions of these age-regressors with the year of inow in UI. In this way we try to account for the
discontinuous shift in retirement behaviour during the period 2001-2005, following changes in the pension
system described in Section 2.3.
In regression (1) we need to take into account that the cancellation of extended benets on the 11th
August 2003 can a¤ect the estimation of the parameter 3: if this policy change caused a discontinuous shift
in outow (e.g. to a job) for 57.5-59.5 year olds as opposed to 55.5-57.5 year olds, the point estimate will be
biased. Indeed, Tuit and van Ours (2010a) nd that the inow in UI benets used to show a pronounced
spike around the age of 57.5, which became more moderate after January 2004. Comparing characteristics of
the inow before and after January 2004, they conclude that high wage workers before the policy change were
more likely to postpone unemployment until reaching the age of 57.5. In this case, our 2001 57.5-59.5 year
olds have better characteristics than our 2004 inow such that our always search e¤ect3 estimates a lower
bound of the e¤ect of a search requirement change on outow to jobs. Tuit and van Ours (2010b) also show
that the number of married individuals that postpone unemployment until the age of 57.5 is relatively large.
This can be explained by the fact that after UI benets expire, all individuals aged 50+ at the beginning of
unemployment could continue their unemployment spell in a scheme called the IOAW in which the height
of the benets is exactly the same as the extended UI benets (i.e. 70% of minimum wage) but the receipt
of these benets is conditional on income of the partner (see also Section 2.1.2). Indeed, plotting the inow
in UI as a function of age (following Tuit and van Ours, 2010q) but showing it separately for married and
single individuals, Figure 2a depicts that the spike in around age 57.5 in the years before 2004 was mainly
driven by married individuals.8 In other words, individuals that have a partner who receives income have
a higher incentive to postpone unemployment and receive UI benets until age 65. Discontinuation of the
extended benets on the 11th August 2003 therefore made married individuals aged 57.5 at the start of their
unemployment spell disproportionally worse o¤. To capture this e¤ect, we include an interaction e¤ect of
our treatment parameter 3 with being married.
9
8 In order to keep our gure comparable to that of Tuit and van Ours (2010a) we show inow in UI for males only.
9 Inclusion of this regressor generally does not a¤ect our results. Note that this does not imply that the cancellation of
extended benets was ine¤ective: married individuals entering unemployment when being close to 60, would turn 65 before
exhausting their (3.5 instead of 2 years lasting) extended benets and were only moderately a¤ected. In contrast, married
individuals younger than 57.5 at inow lost a full 2 years of extended benets. The fact that we nd a zero result of the
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5.2 Identication and Descriptive Evidence
In order to give some insight into similarity and dissimilarity of the various treatment and control groups,
background characteristics are given in Table 9. Note that for an unbiased estimate of the always search
e¤ect 3, we need to assume that there is no change in some relevant characteristic for individuals becoming
unemployed in 2001 versus those becoming unemployed in 2004, that is discontinuous at an age of 57.5 at
inow. For the continue search e¤ect 5 we need a similarly weak condition: in absence of the change
in search requirements, there should not be a discontinuous change in the hazard rate into jobs (and other
destination states) when turning 57.5 between individuals starting unemployment in 2001 versus individuals
starting unemployment in 2004.10 For the start search e¤ect 3, the treatment e¤ect is correctly identied
under the assumption that individuals aged 57.5+ and starting unemployment in 2001 are a good control
for the business cycle in the sense that they pick up any being in 2004 or beyonde¤ect that the inclusion
of time-varying seasonal e¤ects cannot control for.
Since the always searche¤ect can be considered a sort of before-after regression discontinuity design
(RDD) we do not require our treatment and control groups to develop in the same way in order to correctly
identify this e¤ect. However, it is comforting to see that they do. Looking at individuals aged 57.5-59.5 in
Table 9, we see that individuals becoming unemployed in 2004 seem to be more likely to have a child present
in the household11 and tend to be slightly higher educated as compared to the unemployed in 2001. To the
extent that the increase in education for the inow in 2004 is both typical for the 57.5-59.5 age group and
discontinuous in age, our always search parameter 3 could be overestimating the true treatment e¤ect on
the outow to jobs (assuming individuals with a higher education are to nd jobs faster). However, since the
increase in education seems to be a general phenomenon for the whole sample (aged 55.5-59.5), this e¤ect
will be picked up by the indicator for inow in 2004. The same holds true for the fraction of individuals with
a dependent child. Table 9 therefore gives no indication of a possible bias of the always searche¤ect 3.
Even though observable characteristics of treatment and control groups seem to develop in the same
way, it is instructive to consider the possibility of a discontinuity in unobservables. One cause for such a
discontinuity that we correct for in our regression could be the cancellation of extended benets on August
11th 2003, as is discussed in the previous Section. Alternatively, anticipation of the policy change can
also result in selective inow into unemployment around the time the policy was initiated. Depicting the
residuals of a regression of month dummies on inow into the UI system between the years 2000 and 2005,
Figure 2b does not show any increase in discrepancy between the 57.5- and 57.5+ inow around the 1st
cancellation of extended benets is therefore inherent in our choice of treatment and control groups.
10Do note that there could be a general age e¤ect, in that outow from unemployment (into jobs) already decreases before
turning 57.5. To the extent that this age e¤ect is constant throughout the years, the age regressors are a su¢ cient control and
our estimate of 5 is unbiased. Moreover, including an interaction of age and year of inow does not change the results for
outow to jobs or DI benets for any of the measured treatment e¤ects.
11This probably indicates a cohort e¤ect since the fraction of the younger age group in 2001 having a dependent child is
similar to the fraction for the older age group in 2004.
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of January 2004. The intuition for this is straightforward: since none of the individuals owing into UI in
2003 were exempted from the new rules, there was no incentive to try to circumvent the policy change by
speeding up the ring procedure. Anticipation therefore might only play a role in regression (2), in the sense
that if individuals decide to start searching for a job before the 1st of January 2004, thereby owing out of
unemployment before 2004, the start search e¤ect 3 will be underestimated. However, it seems unlikely that
an unemployed would increase search e¤ort in December as a means to avoid the requirement to increase
search e¤ort in January.
Table 10 describes the proportion of individuals that end their unemployment spell with exit to a job,
retirement and DI benets respectively. Since the number of censored individuals is higher for individuals
becoming unemployed in more recent years, the proportion as a fraction of individuals that are non-censored
is given in parentheses. As expected, older individuals more often ow into retirement, at the expense of
the outow to jobs and DI benets. Moreover, it appears that individuals becoming unemployed in 2004
ow into jobs more often than individuals becoming unemployed in 2001. More importantly, for exit to
DI benets the di¤erence between the age groups seems to decline in the later years From this, we could
conclude that there is at least some e¤ect of the 2004 policy change: stricter search requirements decrease
the relative gap in outow to DI benets between the 55.5-57.5 and 57.5-59.5 year olds.12 Since the increase
in outow to jobs over the years is a development that seems to impact all individuals, Table 10 provides no
indication of an e¤ect of tighter search requirements on the outow to jobs. However, the average duration
until a job is found is decreasing stronger over the years for the older age group than for the younger age
group, from Table 11. This suggests a higher speed of outow to jobs for older unemployed in recent years.
Note, however, that the observation window for individuals rst observed in 2004 is considerably smaller
than for those that became unemployed in 2001. The average and median duration for the outow to jobs for
those starting their unemployment spell in 2004 are therefore considerably underestimated. Indeed, there
is a 48% censoring rate for those aged 57.5-59.5 and becoming unemployed in 2004 (Table 10). We will
therefore apply duration analysis in order to get a more detailed view of the e¤ects of the policy change.
6 Estimation Results
6.1 Nonparametric Results
Since the decriptive statistics do not take censoring into account, it is instructive to estimate survivor and
hazard functions for the various times of inow and age groups. From Figure 3, depicting the nonparametric
estimation of the (kernel) smoothed hazards, we can see that for exit to a job the di¤erence in outow
12From Table 10 it seems that instead of observing an increase in inow to DI for the older age group, there is a decline in
inow to DI for the younger age group. Indeed, inow in DI declined following changes in the DI system in 2002 (De Jong,
2008). The fact that there was no decline in DI inow for individuals aged 57.5-59.5 indicates that there was another change
specically a¤ecting DI inow for this age group - for example, the change in search requirements.
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rate between the age groups is smaller for the 2003 and 2004 inows as compared to the 2001 (and 2002)
inows. This is as expected, since for the 2001 inow, the 57.5-59.5 year olds never needed to search for a
job, whereas the 55.5-57.5 year olds did. This gives some condence in a positive e¤ect of the tightening
of search requirements for the age 57.5-59.5 inow13 . However, individuals that were slightly younger and
entered unemployment in 2004 were also a¤ected by the policy change: they needed to continue searching
even when they turned 57.5. In order to separate these two e¤ects, we resort to parametric duration analysis
and estimate equation (1) specied in Section 5.1. Similarly, in order to separate a general business cycle
e¤ect (of becoming unemployed in 2003) from the e¤ect of the policy change, we continue by estimating
equation (2) parametrically.
6.2 Parametric results
Regression equation (1) is specied for the three exit states out of unemployment: exit to a job, (early)
retirement, or DI benets. The focus is on the coe¢ cients 3 and 5, capturing the always searchand the
continue searche¤ects. An overview of treatment e¤ects for the two regression specications is given in
Tables 12 and 13. Full results from our basline model are given in Tables 14 and 15 (regression 1) and 16 and
17 (regression 2). Note that results are given in exponentiated coe¢ cients and can therefore be interpreted
as a change in the (overall) hazard ratio as a result of a 1-unit change in the corresponding covariate. If
there is any positive e¤ect of stricter search requirements for older unemployed on the inow to jobs/early
retirement/DI, we would therefore expect coe¢ cients to be signicantly larger than 1. Separate models are
estimated for males and females, following the results of Wald tests which for each exit state clearly rejected
a joint model (p<0.01). A joint model is estimated on regression equation (2) for exit to DI, since a Wald test
indicated that joint estimation is acceptable (p=0.11). In our baseline model, which includes background
regressors as described in Section 5.1, we indeed nd always searchhazard ratios for the exit to jobs equal to
1.75 (males) and 1.96 (females). Loosely speaking, an unemployed man who is older than 57.5 at inow and
needs to search for jobs has a speed of outow to jobs that is 1.75 times the speed of outow of 57.5+ year
olds that do not face any search requirements. The e¤ect of a search requirement becoming e¤ective at age
57.5 when an individual is between 55.5 and 57.5 at the time of inow (i.e. the continue searche¤ect) is of
similar magnitude, increasing the hazard rate by a factor 1.95 (males) and 1.77 (females) over the remaining
duration of the spell. Do note that the magnitude of the coe¢ cients is not informative on the magnitude of
the absolute di¤erences in outow rates: since the e¤ect of continued search is measured only over the latter
part of the unemployment spell, where outow rates are lower for all individuals, the absolute e¤ect of the
search requirement change could very well be larger for the 57.5+ year olds. We therefore graphically show
in Figures 4, 5 and 6 the treatment e¤ects by estimating parametric hazards for the treatment and control
groups after estimation. The hazard functions are calculated for all treated individuals and subsequently
13Note from Figure 3 that also for exit to DI benets, nonparametric hazard rates for the two age groups seem to move
(much) closer together in later years.
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averaged in order to show an average (intention to) treatment e¤ect on the treated. From a comparison of
the parametric hazards for exit to a job and exit to DI, it can be seen that although point estimates for the
treatment parameters for exit to DI are higher in terms of hazard ratios, the absolute e¤ect on the hazard
rate is smaller following a smaller baseline hazard for the exit to DI.
Since in a competing risk setting, an increase in the hazard rate cannot directly be interpreted as an
increase in the number of individuals leaving to a certain exit state, we simulate in Figure 7 the treatment
e¤ects in terms of an increased outow to jobs and disability benets respectively. From this, we conclude
that the outow to jobs is expected to increase with about 6 percentage points following an introduction
of compulsory search requirements both for individuals aged 57.5+ that needed to search from the start of
their unemployment spell (always search) and for an individual aged 57 that needed to continue search
when turning 57.5 (continue search14). However, there was also an increase of 2.5 to 4 percentage points in
take up of disability benets for individuals aged 57.5+ and aged 57 respectively. An unwanted side-e¤ect
of stricter search requirements therefore is an increase in the proportion of individuals that stop claiming UI
benets, but requesting other social insurance payments instead. For our start searche¤ect measured by
the parameter 3 in equation (2), we can see from Figure 7 that there is an insignicant increase in outow
to jobs and a small and insignicatn increase in outow to DI benets for an individual that is already
unemployed for 9 months and only then is requested to show his job search e¤orts to the unemployment
o¢ ce. As for the exit to retirement, there is no general pattern in the estimated treatment e¤ects in Tables
12 and 13. As explained in Sections 2.3 and 3, the transition from a PAYG to an actuarially fair capital
funded early retirement system greatly reduced the incentive to retire early in the early 2000s. Since this
e¤ect cannot be separated from the e¤ect of search requirements in UI, our estimates are biased downwards.
Cumulative incidence functions for this exit state are therefore omitted.15
7 Sensitivity Analysis
After estimation of the model including only the treatment e¤ects (column 1 of Tables 12 and 13), our
baseline model including background regressors (column 2), adding as regressors the sector of the previous
job (column 3) and incorporating gamma distributed unobserved heterogeneity parameters (column 4), a few
concerns on the interpretation of the coe¢ cients remain. Results on selected sensitivity checks are reported
in Tables 18 and 19. In all sensitivity checks, we compare our results to that of the baseline model in column
2 of Tables 12 and 13.
14Since the initiation of the treatment e¤ect is perfectly dependent on the age at entry, we choose to depict the cumulative
incidence function for our continue searche¤ect for an individual aged 57 at entry. In this case, the treatment becomes e¤ective
after 6 months in unemployment.
15 In estimating the treatment e¤ect in terms of outow probabilities, we do need to take retirement into account as an
alternative exit state. Indeed, if outow to retirement decreased, it means more individuals can exit to a job and therefore the
estimated treatment e¤ect (in terms of outow probabilities) for exit to jobs will be underestimated if exit to retirement is not
taken into account.
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First, the age range from 55.5-59.5 might be too wide to be able to precisely estimate the always search
and continue searchparameters in regression (1). We therefore estimate equation (1) using only 56.5-58.5
year-olds. As can be seen from column 2 of Table 18, treatment parameters for exits to jobs, early retirement
or disability hardly change.
Second, for regression equation (2), instead of only selecting individuals that became unemployed in
2003 until the 11th August we can choose to form a treatment group containing all individuals becoming
unemployed in 2003. The treatment parameters remain of similar magnitude, again strengthening our
condence that the cancellation of extended UI benets does not interfere with our results.
Third, we can make use of a di¤erent control group. In column 3 of Table 18 and Table 19 we show results
when using the individuals becoming unemployed in 2002 instead of 2001 as a control group. Interestingly,
in regression (1) the estimated treatment e¤ects for exit to disability seem slightly larger for males, and
slightly smaller for females using this control group. Moreover, the start search e¤ect for exit to a job as
estimated in regression (2) becomes signicantly positive for females.
A large number of other sensitivity checks were carried out16 : we included average (monthly) wage
earned in the previous occupation as an indicator of productivity. Unfortunately, including previous wage
as a regressor results in a loss of about 70% of observations. Including this regressor did not lead to large
changes in results, either qualitatively or quantitatively. The coe¢ cient estimate on wage itself was often
close to 1 and never signicant.
Another concern with regression (1) might be that it is important to account for the possibility that
business cycle e¤ects inuence older age groups di¤erently (Jaimovich and Siu, 2009). However, including an
interaction e¤ect of age with year of inow did not lead to large changes in the estimates. Moreover, adding
also an interaction of age with our treatment group (2 - being older than 57.5 at entry into unemployment
17)
and an interaction of age with our always search treatment parameter 3 (i.e. with age as our control
function specied in a totally exible way) leads to larger coe¢ cient estimates on our treatment e¤ects. In
order to keep the specication parsimonious, we exclude these extra regressors from our baseline specication.
Analogous to the exible age-function, we can specify a exible marriage-functionby interacting our
dummy for being married with the indicator for the year of inow in unemployment (1), and with the
indicator for being a member of the treatment group (2). This again did not lead to large changes in the
estimated treatment e¤ects.
In order to strengthen our believe that the regression specications do not erroneously return signicant
results on treatment parameters, we re-ran both regression specications using 50.5-54.5 year olds, letting
our 50.5-52.5 olds play a fake control group (fake in the sense that they were also treated) and indeed we
16Results are available from the authors on request.
17Since the MPH specication dictates individuals with a higher baseline hazard to have a higher (absolute) treatment e¤ect,
an interaction of age with the dummy for treatment group can take into account possible di¤erential e¤ects of treatment by
age that do not need to follow the direction of the actual e¤ect of age on outow.
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could not nd an extra e¤ect of the policy reform for the (redened) older age group.18 Another check on the
e¤ectiveness of the reform was to re-run our regression specication (1) using instead of individuals becoming
unemployed in 2004 and 2001 as our treatment and control group, individuals becoming unemployed in 2001
and 1999 respectively (both groups of individuals were not treated). Indeed, we did not nd any e¤ect of
this fake reform on outow to jobs, early retirement, or disability benets.
As a check on heterogeneity of treatment e¤ects (over and above the heterogeneity dictated by the
proportional hazard structure) we ran regressions on specic subgroups of the population. From a policy
perspective, it is interesting to know whether search requirements are especially (and maybe only) e¤ective
for high employability individuals. These individuals face better prospects when actively searching for jobs
and might therefore be a¤ected the most by a compulsory search requirement. On the other hand, the same
individuals could also be the ones that use informal search channels even without a search requirement,
precisely because the expected payo¤ of searching is higher. Moreover, these are the same individuals
who can be expected to have a lower disutility of working. We tested these hypotheses by running separate
regressions by educational level. We could not derive any general pattern from the results of these regressions.
A general concern with the estimation of competing risks in a one-by-one equation setting is that time to
exit for the di¤erent states might be interrelated. Although neglecting possible correlation in hazard rates
to the various exit states should not inuence the estimation of interaction/treatment e¤ects as much as
level e¤ects, it is nevertheless instructive to jointly estimate the 3-equation model. For this aim, we specify
a multivariate mixed proportional hazards model with Heckman-Singer (1984) heterogeneity. We make use
2 mass points of the heterogeneity distribution per equation and construct logit functions to estimate the
mixing probabilities. A more elaborate description of the Likelihood is given in Appendix A.2. Results of
the estimation are given in Table 20. Sign and magnitude of the estimates are very similar to the single
equation estimation results.
As a nal sensitivity check, note that the continue searche¤ect 5 should be close to the e¤ect measured
by Heyma and van Ours (2005) who study the same policy but only make use of variation at the age-
threshold to study exit rates to jobs. Selecting a sample of individuals aged 55.5-57.5 they study the e¤ect
of the discontinuity in search requirements at the age of 57.5 before the policy change. In our regression
specication (1) we can check for possible misspecication. Take for example a misspecication of the way
duration dependence enters the model(s): in our model, we need that the possible bias in the specication of
duration dependence is the same for individuals becoming unemployed in 2001 and in 2004 (absent any level
e¤ects). In the model by Heyma and van Ours (2005) it is needed that there is no bias in the specication for
duration dependence. Similar results therefore strenghtens condence in the functional form specications.
Second and related, the assumption that absent any discontinuity in policy design at the age-threshold, there
would be a continuous age e¤ect on the outow to a job can be checked by comparing our results to results
from a simple RDD estimation as done in Heyma and van Ours (2005). Indeed, our estimated continue to
18For exit to a job for males, we did nd a signicant and positive estimate of 1.43 on our always search3 parameter.
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searche¤ect is close to being the reciprocal of their discontinue to searche¤ect which is to be expected if
both models are correctly specied. Moreover, from the full results of our baseline model depicted in Tables
14 and 15 we can see that before policy change, there was a discontinuity at age 57.5 both for males for
females. After the policy change, this discontinuity disappeared.19
8 Post-unemployment job characteristics
Because an expansion of search requirements entails an increase in search costs, thereby decreasing the value
of being unemployed, it is predicted that the 1st of January 2004 policy change does not only increase
search e¤ort, but also decreases the reservation wage. Both have an upward e¤ect on the outow to jobs.
Although an increase in search e¤ort is the e¤ect that policy makers would like to establish enforcing these
search requirements, another possibility is that elderly are matched to lower-skilled and lower-paid jobs.
It is therefore interesting to examine the e¤ects on post-unemployment job characteristics more closely.
Table 21 gives a rst indication of the importance of these e¤ects. For most of our groups, the wage
distribution after unemployment is not rst-order stochastically dominated by the wage distribution before
unemployment. Instead, the wage distribution after unemployment is more dispersed than the distribution
before unemployment, indicating that although some individuals need to give up some salary in order to
get re-employed, there is also a considerable group of individuals that receives a higher wage after the
unemployment spell. If anything, the di¤erence between wages previously earned and wages accepted is
decreasing over time between the age groups. Whereas the decrease in accepted wages and previous wages
for unemployed aged 57.5-59.5 is large when they become unemployed in 2001, individuals aged 55.5-57.5 are
earning wages comparable to their previous wage. For individuals becoming unemployed in 2003 and 2004
however, the loss (or gain) in wages accepted is very much equal between the two age groups. In conclusion,
these descriptives do not provide direct evidence for a declining reservation wage theory.
Not only reservation wages may decline upon an increase in search costs, individuals may also start
searching for jobs that are di¤erent in other respects. For example elderly may only be able to nd part-time
employment after an unemployment spell. Table 22 describes the fraction of individuals that were in part-
time, full-time or exible work arrangements both before and after the unemployment spell. As is intuitive,
older individuals (aged 57.5+) indeed more often take up part-time employment after a spell of unemploy-
ment, trying to bridge the last couple of years to the pensionable age of 65 (i.e. they take up so-called
bridge-jobs). Although the fraction of full-time workers has decreased over the years, there does not seem
to be a clear pattern between the treatment and control groups: individuals becoming unemployed in any
year are about half as likely to have a full-time job after their unemployment spell. In contrast, employment
with exible hours has become more popular as an option to take up a job for older unemployed. Taken
19This can be seen from the parameter estimates presented in Tables 14 and 15: 4  5 = 0:59  1:84  1 for males and
4  5 = 0:57  1:89  1 for females.
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together, Table 22 does not indicate that the 2004 policy change had large e¤ects on post-unemployment
job characteristics.
9 Conclusions
As the challenges associated with an ageing population become more prominent and many countries increase
statutory retirement age, it becomes all the more important to document the e¤ects of labor market policies
on behaviour of the elderly. This paper deals with one such policy, namely the imposition of job search
requirements for older unemployed. Using a large administrative database covering all wage and social
security payments to Dutch individuals in the years 1999-2005, we can examine the e¤ect of a tightening of
search requirements which was specically aimed at the elderly. The reform, coming into e¤ect on the 1st of
January 2004, made an end to the special treatment of unemployed elderly. Before the law was initiated, an
individual turning 57.5 did not need to report his/her search e¤ort to the unemployment o¢ ce any longer.
The new policy however required elderly to continue actively searching for a job even after turning 57.5.
Using di¤erence-in-di¤erence techniques and regression discontinuity designs within a duration framework,
we estimate the e¤ect of this reform on outow to jobs, early retirement and disability benets for the
various a¤ected groups of individuals aged 55.5 to 59.5. The main conclusions pertain that although outow
to jobs increased with 6 percentage points in the 24 months after a tightening of search obligations, this was
accompanied by a 2.5 to 4 percentage point increase in the number of individuals that used DI benets as
an alternative exit route. In light of the evidence that UI benets and DI benets are alternative pathways
to early retirement, one would expect outow to retirement to increase as well. However, our estimation
methods cannot separate between the changes in the UI and in the early retirement system, and therefore
cannot provide evidence for an increased outow to early retirement. An interesting venue for further research
would be to estimate the impact of extended search conditions for elderly on their after-unemployment job
characteristics. Theory predicts that an increase in search costs will decrease reservation wages and might
therefore lock the elderly into low-skilled and low-paid jobs, another unwanted side-e¤ect of a policy that is
meant to induce elderly to become more active labor market participants.
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Appendices
A.1 Institutional Background
A.1.1 The Dutch Unemployment Insurance Procedure
An unemployed job seeker is expected to register at the unemployment o¢ ce (UWV werkbedrijf) on the
rst day following unemployment. During this rst intake, the unemployment o¢ ce makes an estimation
considering the employability of the individual. On the basis of objective characteristics such as profession,
labor market experience, education and age, and the impression by the caseworker during the intake itself
(subjective characteristics) the individual is distributed to a certain phase. Phase 1 individuals are assumed
to be able to nd work within 6 months without any further assistance. Other individuals (phases 2, 3 and
4) receive job search assistance and can be assigned to ALMPs by the unemployment o¢ ce.
Within a maximum of 8 days following the intake the individual again needs to report at the unemploy-
ment o¢ ce. During this meeting, the unemployed is informed about his rights and duties. Specically, he
is informed about the procedures regarding the job search requirements. An individual needs to make a
minimum of 4 applications per 4 weeks to suitablejobs. In the rst six months of unemployment, a job
is considered suitable when (i) the individual has obtained exactly the level of education required for the
job20 (ii) earnings are not below or not signicantly belowearnings in the previous job (iii) travel time per
day is not more than 2 hours. Apart from the 4-applications-in-4-weeks-requirement an individual is also
expected to consult a public vacancy information system. Moreover, he needs to accept any suitable jobs
o¤ered to him by the unemployment o¢ ce. Apart from these job search and job acceptance requirements,
an individual is expected to participate in the advised active labor market programs (if any).
In the weeks following this second intake, an individual needs to report to the caseworker at the unemploy-
ment o¢ ce every 4 to 6 weeks. These meetings are meant primarily for checking if job search requirements are
being lived up to. In case the caseworker suspects that an individual did not make enough job applications,
an o¢ cial at the unemployment o¢ ce is informed. The o¢ cial then decides whether a sanction needs to be
imposed, of which the individual is notied (in written form). The unemployed is then given the opportunity
to defend his case (either written or spoken).21 If it is decided that the individual was to blame for the lack
of job applications, he is send a letter in which it is explained when and with what amount his benets are
cut. The maximum cut for a rst misbehavior corresponds to a decrease in benets by 20 percentage points
for 16 consecutive weeks (i.e. from 70% to 50% of previous wage/minimum wage). This cut is the same
regardless of the individual receiving short-term, wage-related, or follow-up benets. In case the individual
was only to blame partially, the cut is 10 percentage points. In case the individual did not follow up on the
20 Individuals with a master degree are also obliged to accept work on the bachelor level
21 It can also occur that the o¢ cial, by checking the formal evidence on job applications, is the one to discover that the
individual does not comply to the job search requirements. In this case, he contacts the caseworker to conrm his suspicion or
he contacts the unemployed individual immediately.
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job search requirements a second time within two years, the benet cut can be as a high as 30 percentage
points.
A.1.2 Changes in the DI System 2001-2005
For completeness, in this section we present changes in the DI system that were mainly aimed at employers.
The presumably largest changes in the DI system took place in 2002 and 2004. From April 1st 2002, the
Gatekeeper Improvement Act (Wet Verbetering Poortwachter) species that both employers and employees
must prove that they have put enough e¤ort in preventing inow in the DA during the one year period of
sickness spend in the SA. When the unemployment o¢ ce decides that the reintegration programme does
not su¢ ce, the period in which the employer pays sickness benets (the SA period) is extended for at most
one year. Alternatively, DA payments to the employee are refused or reduced. Incentives to enter the DA
are therefore signicantly decreased. However, in absence of an employer, the Act is not expected to have
reduced SA inow from unemployed workers.
Since January 1st 2002, employers get a 2% reduction on the DA premium paid for a worker at least 57
years of age (on the 1st of January of that year). An employer might therefore be more willing to hire 57+
year olds. Since employersDA premiums comprised 4.76% of gross wage, this implies that less than 0.1%
of gross wage could be saved by hiring a 57+-year old. Note again that this policy provides incentives for
employers, and is not likely to inuence behaviour of the unemployed. Although the number of job o¤ers to
older unemployed might have increased slightly as a result of this reform, the savings on hiring a 57+-year
old are so small that this is not likely to inuence our results. Another possibly relevant adjustment came
into e¤ect on the 1st of July 2003. As from this date, it is possible for employers to accept responsibility
for payment of SA benets to former employees (becoming unemployed less than 1 month before they get
sick).22 In exchange, employersSA premiums are reduced. This change could reduce inow in SA of UI-
benet recipients in the rst month of unemployment. However, only 26 mainly small employers took up this
new right until January 1st 2005. The policy change was therefore considered unsuccessful and was abolished
in May 2006. It is therefore unlikely that this temporary adjustment in the system will a¤ect our results.
Another reform, institutionalized on the 1st of January 2004, portayed an extension of the maximum length
of SA benets from 1 to 2 years. For the employer, this meant that an ill employee would cost him/her a
maximum of two years of wage payments, instead of one. From this moment on, also unemployed individuals
received two years of SA benets before transferring to the DA. As with the Gatekeeper Improvement Act,
such a policy measure aimed at increasing reintegration incentives of employers does not have a bite for
individuals without an employer. Another law that we consider was governed on the 1st of January 2004
and dictated that employers do not have to pay basic (non-di¤erentiated) DA premium when hiring a 50+
year old. Because this a¤ects all individuals in our sample (aged 55.5-59.5) equally, this new policy cannot
inuence our results. Finally, on the 1st August 2004, the collective agreement on DA for self-employed is
22The act is known as the Act Personal Liability SA (Wet eigen risico dragen Ziektewet, WEZ).
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abolished. From that date on, self-employed are expected to self-insure via private insurers. Since we do not
consider self-employed in our analysis, the change does not a¤ect our estimates.
A.2 Multivariate Mixed Proportional Hazard Model with Heckman Singer het-
erogeneity
The hazard rate for exit state x is dened as:
x1(tjX) = (t) expfX 0gvx1 (4)
x2(tjX) = (t) expfX 0gvx2 (5)
Where the constants are normalized to zero for identication.
The baseline hazard (t) species duration dependence in the form of a exible piecewise constant
function:
(t) = exp
 
KX
k=1
kIk(t)
!
With Ik(t) the indicator function taking the value 1 if t is in interval k. There are K = 7 duration
intervals, dened as durations from 0-1 month, 1-2 months, 2-3 months, 3-6 months, 6-12 months, 12-24
months and 24+ months. We normalize 1 = 0.
Assuming an exponential distribution, the survivor function for surviving from period t0 up to period
t1for a spell with exit state x can be written as:
Sx1 (t1jX; t0) = exp

 
Z t1
t0
x1(sjX)ds

=
exp(  expfX 0gt1vx1 )
exp(  expfX 0gt0vx1 )
Sx2 (t1jX; t0) = exp

 
Z t1
t0
x2(sjX)ds

=
exp(  expfX 0gt1vx2 )
exp(  expfX 0gt0vx2 )
The likelihood contribution for 1 individual reads
Li = p1
XY
x=1
x1(tjX)d
x
Sx1 (T jX) + p2
XY
x=1
x2(tjX)d
x
Sx2 (T jX) (6)
With dx an indicator function equal to 1 if exit to state x is observed and X the number of exit states
(3 in our case). The parameters p1 and p2 are probabilities assigned to the mass points, specied as logit
functions:
p1 =
1
1 + exp(q1)
; p2 =
exp(q1)
1 + exp(q1)
= 1  p1
The (log)likelihood is maximized w.r.t. X 0; k; v
x
i and q1. By assuming only partial mixing, the number
of parameters in the probability functions that need to be estimated has been reduced from 7 to 1.
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A.3 Figures and Tables
Figure 1. POTENTIAL UI BENEFIT DURATION
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Figure 3: NONPARAMETRIC ESTIMATION OF HAZARD FUNCTIONS
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Figure 4: PARAMETRIC ESTIMATION OF HAZARD FUNCTIONS
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Figure 5: PARAMETRIC ESTIMATION OF HAZARD FUNCTIONS
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Figure 6: PARAMETRIC ESTIMATION OF HAZARD FUNCTIONS
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Figure 7 - CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE FUNCTIONS
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Table 1. ELIGIBILTY REQUIREMENTS, DURATION AND HEIGHT OF UI BENEFITS 2001-2005
type of UI benet eligibility requirements duration payment
short-term UI-benets 26-out-of-39 weeks requirement 6 months 70% of minimum wage or
70% of previous wage
whichever is lower
wage-related UI-benets 26-out-of-39 weeks requirement 6 months to 5 years, 70% of previous wage
+ 4-out-of-5 years requirement dependent on age
follow-up-benets 26-out-of-39 weeks requirement 2 years if <57.5 at time 70% of minimum wage or
+ 4-out-of-5 years requirement of unemployment, 70% of previous wage
otherwise 3.5 years whichever is lower
Note: benets are granted to a maximum (about 29.000 euro per year in 2003)
Table 2. OVERVIEW OF CHANGES IN THE UI-SYSTEM AIMED AT THE ELDERLY, 2001-2005
date policy change
2001, may 11th employers pay part of UI-benets for 57.5+ year olds
2003, aug 11th follow-up-benets cancelled
2004, jan 1st 57.5+ year olds are (also) required to search actively
2005, jan 1st max. UI duration determined partly by employment history
2006, oct 1st max. UI duration reduced from 60 to 38 months
payments increased from 70% to 75% in rst two months
26-out-of-39 becomes 26-out-of-36
Table 3. NUMBER OF SANCTIONED INDIVIDUALS PER YEAR
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
total 28774 34829 49368 48440 38931
- as a % of number of individuals in UI 7.68 7.35 9.04 9.15 a)
non-compliance with required # of job applications 12999 15120 23808 22327 15729
- as a % of number of individuals in UI 3.47 3.19 4.36 4.22 a)
- as a % of total number of sanctioned individuals 45.18 43.41 48.23 46.09 40.40
non-compliance with job applications on a suitable level 65 76 93 113 78
- as a % of number of individuals in UI 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 a)
- as a % of total number of sanctioned individuals 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.23 0.20
Data on sanctions are aggregate statistics from the unemployment o¢ ce (UWV).
a) could not be calculated since the number of individuals is calculated making use of our 1999-2005 data.
Publicly available aggregate statistics are on the number of benets, not individuals. Since one individual
can receive multiple UI benets within a year (and even at the same time) this gure cannot be used here
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Table 4. AVERAGE HEIGHT AND DURATION OF SANCTIONS
average height of sanctions - percentage points cut in UI benets
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
total 17.81 17.54 16.98 16.27 15.62
non-compliance with required # of job applications 20.96 20.99 20.88 20.92 20.85
non-compliance with job applications on a suitable level 23.06 22.24 23.98 24.69 22.37
average duration of sanctions (in weeks)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
total 7.49 7.42 7.93 7.48 6.93
non-compliance with required # of job applications 14.77 14.07 14.07 14.23 13.83
non-compliance with job applications on a suitable level 13.55 15.26 12.99 12.54 16.33
Data on sanctions are aggregate statistics from the unemployment o¢ ce (UWV).
Table 5. ORIGIN OF UI SPELL (I.E. STATE OF INFLOW)
year of inow in UI 2001 2003 2004
1st jan - 10th aug
age at inow in UI 55.5-57.5 57.5-59.5 55.5-57.5 57.5-59.5 55.5-57.5 57.5-59.5
private sector job 3152 3476 4414 3675 6270 5292
(0.83) (0.86) (0.85) (0.88) (0.86) (0.87)
DI benets 596 554 724 480 922 702
(0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12)
other 38 25 51 33 95 59
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
TOTAL 3786 4055 5189 4188 7287 6053
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Table 6. MULTIPLE SPELLS FOR THE SAME INDIVIDUAL
Number of Persons Number of Spells
(fraction)
Observed once 25806 25806
(0.93)
Observed twice 1789 3579
(0.06)
Observed three times 207 621
(0.01)
Observed four times 12 48
(0.00)
TOTAL 27814 30053
Table 7. IDENTIFICATION REGRESSION 1
turning 57.5,
being <57.5@inow being >57.5@inow being <57.5@inow
inow in 2001 a b, 2 e, 4
inow in 2004 c, 1 d, 1+2+3 f,1+4+5
c-a=1 d-b=3+1 f-e=1+5
Note: 3=(d-b)-(c-a): e¤ect of needing to search always as opposed to never (age at inow >57.5)
Note: 5=(f-e)-(c-a): e¤ect of needing to continue search at 57.5 (age at inow <57.5)
Table 8. IDENTIFICATION REGRESSION 2
till 1 jan 2004, from 1 jan 2004 ,
being >57.5@inow being >57.5@inow
inow in 2001 a b, 2
inow in 2003 c, 1 d, 1+2+3
c-a=1 d-b=1+3
Note: 3=(d-b)-(c-a): e¤ect of starting to search (@ 1 jan 2004) after
5-12 months of unemployment as opposed to never (age at inow >57.5)
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Table 9. BACKGROUND CHARACTERSTICS
year of inow in UI 2001 2003 2004
1st jan - 10th aug
age at inow in UI 55.5-57.5 57.5-59.5 55.5-57.5 57.5-59.5 55.5-57.5 57.5-59.5
Age 56.46 58.33 56.47 58.42 56.48 58.36
Female 0.31 0.25 0.30 0.28 0.32 0.27
Single 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.07
Married 0.74 0.79 0.71 0.77 0.73 0.76
Divorced/widowed 0.18 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.17
Dutch 0.85 0.86 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.85
Western 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.11
Non Western 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Dependent child 0.27 0.21 0.30 0.23 0.35 0.27
Education low 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.11
Education mid1 0.35 0.37 0.31 0.34 0.32 0.33
Eudcation mid2 0.32 0.31 0.39 0.34 0.38 0.37
Education high 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.18 0.19 0.18
Revived UI right 0.19 0.10 0.19 0.12 0.22 0.19
short PBD 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.05
long PBD 0.87 0.92 0.89 0.92 0.91 0.93
Monthly UI benets 1177 1316 1267 1375 1187 1269
# Hours in UI 32.84 33.77 32.77 33.20 32.65 33.25
# Observations 3152 3476 4414 3675 6270 5292
Note: denition of variables is explained in the text
Table 10. EXIT DESTINATIONS (FRACTIONS)
year of inow in UI 2001 2003 2004
1st jan - 10th aug
age at inow in UI 55.5-57.5 57.5-59.5 55.5-57.5 57.5-59.5 55.5-57.5 57.5-59.5
Job 0.48 0.32 0.40 0.28 0.43 0.31
(0.57) (0.43) (0.56) (0.41) (0.66) (0.52)
Retirement 0.18 0.34 0.08 0.22 0.07 0.13
(0.20) (0.44) (0.13) (0.35) (0.09) (0.24)
DI benets 0.17 0.09 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.08
(0.21) (0.12) (0.21) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12)
Censored 0.17 0.25 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.48
# Observations 3152 3476 4414 3674 6270 5292
Note: in parentheses: as a fraction of non-censored observations
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Table 11. MEAN AND MEDIAN OF DURATION VARIABLES, DAYS
year of inow in UI 2001 2003 2004
1st jan - 10th aug
age at inow in UI 55.5-57.5 57.5-59.5 55.5-57.5 57.5-59.5 55.5-57.5 57.5-59.5
Total duration
- mean 525 701 477 544 304 329
- median 179 455 346 488 252 326
to job
- mean 185 189 238 236 171 158
- median 109 123 154 183 133 126
to retirement
- mean 690 594 252 414 122 209
- median 639 548 182 371 60 184
to DI
- mean 238 402 250 334 194 178
- median 139 272 167 279 161 136
Note: all spells (including censored ones at 31st dec 2005) included.
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Table 14. TREATMENT EFFECTS, FULL RESULTS REGRESSION 1 - MALES
Exit to a job Exit to retirement Exit to DI benets
I04 0.83 0.80 0.49
I[aI57.5] 0.56 1.00 0.36
I[aI57.5]*I04 - 3 1.38 1.55 2.39
I[a57.5] 0.59 1.20 0.44
I[a57.5]*I04 - 5 1.84 0.81 3.08
3*married 0.97 0.91 0.92
married 1.03 1.38 0.80
age 0.80 0.82
age2 1.04 1.05
west 1.07 0.85 0.95
non-west 0.77 0.89 1.41
kid 1.26 0.93 1.16
educ2 1.02 1.13 0.97
educ3 1.03 1.36 0.83
educ4 0.87 1.62 0.59
revived 1.12 0.53 1.24
long PBD 0.59 4.07 1.27
unknown PBD 0.89 1.73 0.94
quarter2 0.82 0.29 0.54
quarter3 0.48 0.28 0.62
quarter4 0.27 0.25 0.42
I2 1.73 1.10 0.91
I3 1.98 0.66 0.93
I4 2.14 0.47 0.92
I5 0.97 0.49 0.74
I6 0.43 0.45 0.45
I7 0.09 0.35 0.26
I[56.5a57.5] 1.00
I[57.5a58.5] 1.09
I[58.5a59.5] 0.99
I[59.5a60.5] 2.80
I[60.5a61.5] 1.71
I[61.5a62.5] 2.67
I[62.5a63.5] 1.21
I[62.5a63.5] 0.00
I[56.5a57.5]*I04 0.84
I[57.5a58.5]*I04 0.63
I[58.5a59.5]*I04 0.79
I[59.5a60.5]*I04 0.69
I[60.5a61.5]*I04 0.46
# Obs 12945 12945 12945
# Failures 5108 2241 1189
Note:  indicates p<0.1,  indicates p<0.05,  indicates p<0.01
Note: 3: e¤ect of needing to search always as opposed to never (age at inow >57.5)
Note: 5: e¤ect of needing to continue search at 57.5 (age at inow <57.5)
A description of regressors can be found in the main text
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Table 15. TREATMENT EFFECTS, FULL RESULTS REGRESSION 1 - FEMALES
Exit to a job Exit to retirement Exit to DI benets
I04 0.72 1.25 0.39
I[aI57.5] 0.45 1.43 0.21
I[aI57.5]*I04 - 3 1.77 0.84 5.19
I[a57.5] 0.57 1.43 0.25
I[a57.5]*I04 - 5 1.89 0.50 3.24
3*married 0.97 1.09 0.72
married 0.85 0.67 0.93
age 0.78 0.96
age2 1.04 0.99
west 0.96 1.03 1.19
non-west 1.18 0.90 1.33
kid 1.24 1.05 1.20
educ2 1.07 1.09 0.95
educ3 1.22 1.40 0.92
educ4 1.34 2.25 0.73
revived 1.17 0.74 1.00
long PBD 0.53 2.62 1.03
unknown PBD 0.95 1.38 1.15
quarter2 0.61 0.53 0.44
quarter3 0.57 0.44 0.51
quarter4 0.37 0.39 0.42
I2 1.77 0.95 0.99
I3 1.62 0.61 1.84
I4 2.08 0.43 1.66
I5 1.13 0.50 1.25
I6 0.45 0.41 0.76
I7 0.10 0.39 0.22
I[56.5a57.5] 0.50
I[57.5a58.5] 1.52
I[58.5a59.5] 0.89
I[59.5a60.5] 6.09
I[60.5a61.5] 2.01
I[61.5a62.5] 2.71
I[62.5a63.5] 1.38
I[63.5a64.5] 1.93
I[56.5a57.5]*I04 1.49
I[57.5a58.5]*I04 0.29
I[58.5a59.5]*I04 0.66
I[59.5a60.5]*I04 0.67
I[60.5a61.5]*I04 1.46
# Obs 5245 5245 5245
# Failures 1680 640 623
Note:  indicates p<0.1,  indicates p<0.05,  indicates p<0.01
Note: 3: e¤ect of needing to search always as opposed to never (age at inow >57.5)
Note: 5: e¤ect of needing to continue search at 57.5 (age at inow <57.5)
A description of regressors can be found in the main text
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Table 16. TREATMENT EFFECTS, FULL RESULTS REGRESSION 2 - MALES
Exit to a job Exit to retirement Exit to DI benets
I03 0.97 1.62 1.27
I[1 Jan 2004] 0.22 0.43 0.33
I03*I[1 Jan 2004] - 3 2.87 0.74 2.63
married 1.00 1.22 0.84
age 2.20 1.40 3.57
age2 0.91 0.99 0.84
west 1.03 0.92 0.83
non-west 0.93 0.93 1.29
kid 1.34 1.04 1.05
educ2 1.02 1.18 0.91
educ3 0.90 1.32 0.93
educ4 0.82 1.72 0.67
revived 1.18 0.58 1.37
long PBD 0.50 2.92 1.06
unknown PBD 1.15 1.64 1.55
quarter2 0.59 0.27 0.43
quarter3 0.35 0.24 0.45
quarter4 0.16 0.21 0.27
I2 1.80 0.66 0.72
I3 2.24 0.69 1.03
I4 2.34 0.73 1.33
I5 1.21 0.93 1.07
I6 0.54 1.48 0.77
I7 0.22 1.80 0.67
# Obs 5252 5252 7151
# Failures 1637 1537 664
Note:  indicates p<0.1,  indicates p<0.05,  indicates p<0.01
Note: 3: e¤ect of starting to search (@ 1 jan 2004) after 5-12 months of unemployment as opposed to never (age at inow >57.5)
A description of regressors can be found in the main text
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Table 17. TREATMENT EFFECTS, FULL RESULTS REGRESSION 2 - FEMALES
Exit to a job Exit to retirement Exit to DI benets
I03 1.46 1.22 1.27
I[1 Jan 2004] 0.22 0.44 0.33
I03*I[1 Jan 2004] - 3 1.94 1.19 2.63
married 0.87 0.67 0.84
age 1.62 1.95 3.57
age2 0.94 0.94 0.84
west 0.77 0.93 0.83
non-west 1.57 0.97 1.29
kid 0.98 0.94 1.05
educ2 0.93 1.19 0.91
educ3 1.07 1.48 0.93
educ4 1.67 2.25 0.67
revived 1.57 0.90 1.37
long PBD 0.37 2.10 1.06
unknown PBD 0.52 0.80 1.55
quarter2 0.38 0.53 0.43
quarter3 0.34 0.41 0.45
quarter4 0.18 0.39 0.27
I2 1.56 0.85 0.72
I3 2.73 1.14 1.03
I4 4.19 0.85 1.33
I5 2.31 1.35 1.07
I6 0.72 2.48 0.77
I7 0.45 2.70 0.67
# Obs 1899 1899 7151
# Failures 462 476 664
Note:  indicates p<0.1,  indicates p<0.05,  indicates p<0.01
Note: 3: e¤ect of starting to search (@ 1 jan 2004) after 5-12 months of unemployment as opposed to never (age at inow >57.5)
A description of regressors can be found in the main text
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Table 20. MULTIVARIATE MIXED PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODEL
REGRESSION 1
MALES
exit to a job exit to retirement exit to DI benets
3 1.40 1.43 2.27
(s.e.) (0.07) (0.19) (0.13)
5 1.88 0.58 3.07
(s.e.) (0.12) (0.21) (0.19)
# Obs 12945 12945 12945
FEMALES
exit to a job exit to retirement exit to DI benets
3 1.98 0.83 4.42
(s.e.) (0.14) (0.45) (0.19)
5 1.95 0.25 3.13
(s.e.) (0.19) (0.48) (0.28)
# Obs 5245 5245 5245
REGRESSION 2
MALES
exit to a job exit to retirement exit to DI benets
3 3.58 0.73 3.02
(s.e.) (0.33) (0.13) (0.30)
# Obs 5252 5252 5252
FEMALES
exit to a job exit to retirement exit to DI benets
3 2.37 1.06 1.93
(s.e.) (0.62) (0.23) (0.52)
# Obs 1899 1899 1899
Note: Standard errors on coe¢ cient estimates (not hazard ratios) in parentheses
Note:  indicates p<0.1,  indicates p<0.05,  indicates p<0.01
Note: 3: e¤ect of needing to search always as opposed to never (age at inow >57.5)
Note: 5: e¤ect of needing to continue search at 57.5 (age at inow <57.5)
Note: 3: e¤ect of starting to search (@ 1 jan 2004) after 5-12 months of unemployment (age at inow >57.5)
Results on females for regression 2 are estimated under the assumption of no heterogeneity in retirement behavior,
since without restrictions the heterogeneity terms in the retirement equation would converge to the same point.
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Table 22. TYPE OF WORK BEFORE AND AFTER UNEMPLOYMENT SPELL
year of inow in UI 2001 2003 2004
1st jan - 10th aug
age at inow in UI 55.5-57.5 57.5-59.5 55.5-57.5 57.5-59.5 55.5-57.5 57.5-59.5
Before
Parttime 0.22 0.17 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.27
Fulltime 0.65 0.73 0.57 0.62 0.55 0.61
Flex 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.12
# Observations 1445 1615 2833 2195 4395 3461
After
Parttime 0.34 0.38 0.36 0.45 0.33 0.35
Fulltime 0.45 0.45 0.37 0.32 0.37 0.40
Flex 0.21 0.17 0.28 0.23 0.31 0.25
# Observations 1642 1170 1901 1044 2791 1678
Note: numbers given as a fraction of the number of individuals for whom we observe whether they went to
parttime, fulltime of extime unemployment. That is, the total fraction of individuals in the three
employment types should add up to 1 for each group (apart from e¤ects of rounding).
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